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ITALIAN-STYLE PLURALISM IN ECONOMICS1 
 
DUCCIO CAVALIERI and RICCARDO FAUCCI 
(Universities of Florence and Pisa) 
 
1. Methodological pluralism, theory appraisal, and history in 
economics.  
   
1.1 An interest in the methodology of a scientific subject may 
be justified on various grounds. First, and perhaps more naturally, 
it may be the result of a concern in the local epistemology of a 
specific branch of knowledge, by a practitioner of that science. 
Second, it may be legitimately linked to the search for information 
by a general epistemologist wishing to obtain evidence on the logical 
structure of a scientific subject, for cognitive purposes. A third 
and somewhat less legitimate reason for interest is that of the 
philosopher of science who ascribes himself the task of prescribing 
methodological rules to scientists; even if he knows that they may 
resent this attitude and regard it as a serious impediment in the 
search for methodological pluralism. 
Some aspects of the methodological problem will be discussed in 
this paper, from a historical-critical perspective, with specific 
reference to economic science as practised in this country2. The 
purpose is both to understand why there are different positions in 
the matter of method in the philosophy and in the historiography of 
economics, two scientific subjects which explore the same object of 
study from various points of view, and also to establish whether the 
contrast can be overcome and on which conditions. Our hope is to 
contribute to the transformation of the philosophy of economics into 
a non-prescriptive philosophy of history of economics. 
 
1.2. Professional relationships between economists and 
philosophers have been up to now rather disappointing. The two areas 
of interests seem to have grown far apart from one another. The 
influence exerced on economists by philosophers' analytical work has 
indeed been minimal and limited to the domains of logics and 
epistemology. A similar remark may be made about the impact of 
economic thought on philosophical speculation. 
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The wrong appears to be equally distributed on both sides. The 
unfortunate idea of a pre-eminence of science on philosophy, one of 
the main points of logical empiricism, has probably done as much harm 
to the establishment of good relationships between economics and 
philosophy as the attempt to re-establish the importance of 
ideological and sociological elements in scientific explanation. 
Half a century ago Joseph Schumpeter maintained that economics 
owed very little to the great philosophical streams of the Nineteenth 
and Twentieth centuries3. This was not an accurate statement, as it 
neglected the influence exerced on economics by utilitarianism, 
rationalism and other philosophical doctrines; but was in itself an 
indication that the methodological debate in economics had remained 
up to that time internal to a limited sector of the economic 
profession, without drawing the attention of philosophers of science. 
This unfortunate situation does not seem to have changed to a 
great extent in recent times, in spite of some meritorious attempts 
to fill the gap (as the appearance in 1985 of the half-yearly journal 
Economics and Philosophy). It is still true that only a small number 
of economists cultivate philosophical studies (most of them belong to 
a single school of thought: the neo-Austrian one) and that few 
philosophers take more than an occasional interest in economics. 
As regards in particular the situation in Italy, let us recall 
the personal responsability of a great philosopher, historian and man 
of letters, Benedetto Croce, for the long breakdown in dialogue 
between philosophers and economists which took place in the period 
1930-1950. Croce believed in an ontological hierarchy of importance 
of the various subject matters which study the human world. At the 
very top of the scale he placed historical knowledge; at the bottom, 
abstract human sciences, like pure economics. In a debate which took 
place at the beginning of the century in the Giornale degli 
economisti, Croce, objecting to Vilfredo Pareto's assimilation of 
pure economics to rational mechanics, argued that economics is a 
practical activity and economists should not indulge in theorizing, 
but should rather engage in computation (a non-scientific activity)4. 
This ungenerous statement by one of the most influential philosophers 
of the time marked the breaking off in Italy of the incipient 
dialogue between epistemologists and economists. (For further 
details, see the second chapter). 
The minimal conditions for a dialogue would not be re-
established until half a century later, after the second world war, 
when Italian culture, in its broadest sense, succeeded in freing 
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itself from the Crocian strait jacket. A decisive impulse in this 
direction came, on the one hand, from resumption of an old tradition 
of critical studies in the Marxian theory of value (that of Loria, 
Labriola, Graziadei), with their twofold economic and philosophical 
characterization, and on the other from the diffusion in Italy of the 
philosophical works by Karl Popper, whose interpretation of science 
as an open critical process helped to reject the attempt to reduce 
economics to a simple technique of computation and prediction. 
 
1.3. Turning now to pluralism in economics, let me first try to 
define this concept and to distinguish between methodological and 
theoretical pluralism. Methodological pluralism is the idea that 
there is no single infallible method for doing scientific research. 
As such, it should not be confused either with theoretical pluralism, 
which may be understood as a teorist's willingness to accept 
criticism and dialectical competition among theories, or with 
theoretical eclecticism, the tendency to draw one's views from 
various systems of thought. 
Methodological pluralism is simply the opposite of 
methodological monism, the view that there is just one correct 
scientific methodology. It implies a refusal to recognize two 
mystifying conceptions held by neopositivistic epistemology: the 
existence of a prescriptive scientific methodology, of general 
application, and of an objective criterion suited to demarcate 
science from non-science. From a positive heuristic point of view, 
however, it is not easy to characterize methodological pluralism as a 
definite proposal. The point is that pluralism is not a programme for 
action, but a quest for tolerance, for the abandonment of a single 
prescriptive methodology. 
As regards the relationship of metodological pluralism with 
methodological individualism and methodological holism, it is perhaps 
less easy to take a definite position. In principle pluralism might 
be reconciled with non-prescriptive versions of both such 
conceptions. But it is somewhat problematic to think of non-
prescriptive formulations of an epistemic view according to which all 
economic theories should be grounded on the analysis of an individual 
behaviour subject to deterministic laws. The antithetic "gestaltic" 
conception which assumes that the behaviour of aggregate variables 
cannot be reduced without residuals to those of their alleged 
individual components seems more acceptable. Both holists and 
pluralists thus reject the neoclassical tenet by which only those 
macroeconomic propositions which are suitable to be aggregatively 
founded on microeconomics should be validated. But in a social 
science like economics the unit components of an aggregate do not 
behave in a deterministic way, because of the absence of a teleologic 
or mechanicistic order. Economic aggregates cannot therefore be 
reduced without residuals to an analysis of the underlying 
microeconomic variables. 
 1.4. The fundamental question, for pluralists, is not who 
should fix the methodological rules of the game, but which rules, if 
any, should regulate the growth of a critical knowledge. By critical 
knowledge I mean consciousness that economic phenomena are not 
invariant with respect to time and to the different forms of 
institutional organization. 
Empirical evidence is conclusive in showing that any kind of 
economic knowledge is historically relative. Thus the rejection of 
the neoclassical faith in the general applicability of a "pure" 
economic theory is not an ontological thesis, an undemonstrable 
apriori synthetic proposition, but a legitimate conclusion, derived 
from economic experience. 
When associated, two of the basic premises underlying the 
neoclassical idea of a pure economic theory - the utilitarian 
hypothesis and the rationality assumption - provide a powerful 
analytical tool, because they imply a maximizing individual 
behaviour. This is not simply a prescribed behavioural law in 
normative economics, but also a testable prediction, which can easily 
be checked. Everyone can thus realize that man is not a calculating 
machine, but an unpredictable mixture of situational rationality and 
passion. 
An additional difficulty derives from a third neoclassical 
assumption: that of a perfect market structure, capable of supplying 
through a competitive price system all the information economic 
agents need for their calculus, at zero cost. The trouble is that  
market prices offer no valid support for strategic decisions in the 
face of uncertainty. Because of the presence of imperfections, 
indivisibilities and externalities, real markets are not reliable 
indicators of relative scarcities. 
All this does not mean that the neoclassical theory, in its 
"purest" form, has to be set aside as a wholly irrelevant doctrine; 
rather, it has limited explanatory and predictive power. Economic 
purism and marginal analisis may however retain an important role to 
perform in normative microeconomics, where both methodological 
individualism and the rationality assumption make more sense.  
 
1.5. A compromising epistemic solution, suited to reconcile to 
some extent the different points of view, is offered by the 
particular type of methodological individualism which holds to the 
neoclassical hypothesis of complete individual rationality, but 
interprets it in a non deterministic sense, by admitting the 
possibility that the real behaviour of economic agents may exhibit 
deviations from the rigid model postulated by the theory. There is at 
present a definite trend in this anti-scientist direction. Examples 
of this tendency are Karl Popper's "logic of the situation" and the 
methodological positions held by those authors who identify in a 
"situational determinism" the Lakatosian basis of the degenerating 
research program of neoclassical economics, as concerns the theory of 
the firm. 
These positions testify that the old presumption of an absolute 
rationality has been gradually substituted by a more flexible concept 
- Herbert Simon's innovative notion of "bounded rationality"5 - which 
accounts for the scarce capacity of individual economic agents to 
collect and elaborate all relevant market information, and pays a 
greater attention to the decision-making process. The rapid growth of 
new theories of the firm which assume only a procedural rationality 
(no substantive rationality) testifies this change of methodological 
attitude. 
The traditional assumption of rational economic behaviour thus 
now appears to have been reduced to one of simple conformity to a 
situational logic. This relaxation of the basic premises of the 
neoclassical model has undoubtedly increased its degree of realism 
and its predictive power. Recent neoclassical models incorporate 
costly and incomplete information, stocastic expectations, learning 
by doing and endogenous innovations. A revision of the most critical 
attitudes towards neoclassical theory therefore seems both possible 
and desirable.  
    
1.6. A further point which may be worth discussing is the 
relationship between methodological pluralism and the logic of theory 
appraisal. The prevalent opinion on this problem seems to be that 
methodological pluralism in economics should not imply absence of 
internal control. There is wide concordance on the fact that some 
conventional rule has to be respected in appraising an economic 
theory, or a whole research programme in economics. The only question 
is: which rule? An absolutely general one, covering all sciences, as 
advocated by positivists? Or a more specific one, valid only for 
social sciences, or for economic science alone? The answer to these 
questions is a long and instructive story, which goes back to nearly 
two centuries ago, when the Ricardian hypothetico-deductive approach 
established itself as a standard method of economic reasoning. 
I have no intention to recall that story. But let me note some 
specific points of interest. Inside the classical school, which 
regarded political economy as a deductive scientific subject, there 
was no prejudicial denial of the utility of inductive inference. John 
Stuart Mill maintained that inductive methods should be employed in 
economics - not for discovering truth, but for verifying truth. 
Verificationism was therefore, in this sense, the logical method the 
late classical economists, such as Cairnes and Mill, supported to 
establish the truth or falseness of a specific hypothesis. 
Unfortunately, verificationism - though an essential component 
in the epistemological statute of every subject matter which refers 
directly to the real world - is not applicable to the type of non-
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analytic propositions frequently used by economists. Two reasons may 
be adduced in support of this statement. First, no single criterion 
meets the need of verifying apriori synthetic sentences founded on 
intuitive premises, such as those which affirm the transitivity of 
individual preferences, or the impossibility of interpersonal 
comparisons of utility. Second, verification in economics is bound in 
any case to be highly problematic, both for the non-experimental 
nature of this science and because economic laws are empirical 
correlations devoid of any character of necessity and subject to 
various counteracting influences. 
At the end of the Nineteenth century, the spread of determinist 
positivism brought a revival of verificationism, in a more rigid 
form. The positivistic conception of objective knowledge, modeled on 
natural sciences, was in open contradiction with the historical 
relativity and simple plausibility of economic reasoning. Political 
economy was not the "social physics" positivists had in mind. There 
could be however some room for the temperate kind of economic 
positivism which was reproposed in England at the time of the stormy 
Austro-German Methodenstreit. John Neville Keynes, by inclination a 
methodological pluralist, did much to reaffirm the classical vision 
of the problem and to reconcile it with the positions of the American 
institutionalists and of the German historical school, who were 
resolutely in favour of an inductive method. 
In the history of Italian economic thought, the highest point 
achieved by positivism may be identified with Pareto's attempt to 
free economics from psychological influences. Pareto did not deny the 
logical priority of psychics on economics, but tried to transform the 
latter into a pure theory of choice: the study of those "logical 
actions" which consist in selecting the means most suited for the 
pursuit of given ends. For this purpose, he abandoned the assumption 
of hedonistic behaviour and substituted the traditional individual 
utility function, which implied cardinal measurability, with a more 
palatable "ophelimity" function, involving only an ordinal preference 
scale6. 
On the whole, the influence exerted by utilitarianism upon 
economic culture was somewhat less effective in Italy than elsewhere. 
Though utilitarianism had been readily assimilated, through the works 
of Pantaleoni, De Viti De Marco and other exponents of economic 
hedonism, it remained essentially an imported cultural phenomenon, 
filtered from the writings of foreign authors, such as Gossen, Jevons 
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and Walras. The critical attitude taken with respect to the 
hedonimetric approach to the theory of value by Antonelli, Pareto, 
Barone, and by the philosopher Antonio Labriola, started an intensive 
season of scientific debates. Altogether, the discussion did not show 
violent tones and did not result in a rejection of the utility theory 
of labour. But the anti-hedonistic tendency was largely followed, 
especially by general equilibrium theorists of the Paretian school. A 
number of Italian economists gave evidence that they regarded the 
"hedonistic postulate" as an undemonstrable premise, an unverifiable 
behavioural hypothesis, or an ethical proposition unsuited for 
distinguishing value from pleasure7. 
 
1.7. The real turning point in the methodology of scientific 
research was Karl Popper's "critical epistemology". Without 
questioning the possibility of objective knowledge and the need of a 
demarcation criterion, it substituted the previous search for truth 
by a search for facts and observations capable of disproving a 
conjecture, thus providing a brilliant, reverse solution to the old 
problem of induction, raised by David Hume. Truth could not be 
unambiguously ascertained, but falsity could be rationally criticized 
and successfully refuted. It was a signal that the retreat from 
positivism had begun. Freed from the boundary of the relevance of 
assumptions, the growth of scientific knowledge could at last proceed 
by conjectures and refutations and become a great critical process, a 
continuous adventure of the reason. 
Some doubts were however raised on the possibility of applying 
the falsificationist methodology to a social science such as 
economics, where the ceteris paribus condition which makes theories 
unfalsifiable does not represent, as elsewhere, a simple immunizing 
strategem, purposely adopted to protect a theory from refutation. For 
this reason, Popper himself considered economics a tautological 
subject, devoid of any empirical significance. Its practical function 
could not go beyond measurement of the deviations of real economic 
behaviour from the pure rationality model on which it was founded. 
Popper was not a methodological pluralist. He severely censured 
as historicism any methodological position in the field of social 
sciences which was not in line with his conception. Yet his 
fallibilist perspective was less unilateral than the neopositivist 
pretension to assign a sort of monopoly in the search for truth to 
purely empirical methods. Moreover, at a certain stage of his 
intellectual itinerary, Popper revised his initial position and 
accepted the idea that no economic theory might be conclusively 
discredited by a failure of the empirical testing of its predictions, 
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so long as another theory with a better predictive power was not 
provided. This view represented a "modified" solution to the problem 
of theory control, which accounted for the difficulty of making 
crucial experiments in the presence of prescribed side conditions. 
The above qualification came as a corollary of Popper's 
response to the so-called "Duhem-Quine" irrefutability objection, 
according to which the failure of a theory to meet an empirical test 
could be simply due to the absence in the real world of some of the 
required side conditions8. Quine had argued, against what he called 
the "dogma of reductionism", that no controlled experiment was really 
"crucial", in the Baconian sense of providing conclusive empirical 
evidence in support of a theory and against some other one, since a 
theory always states something more than one can observe or predict. 
This "modified solution" to the problem of theory appraisal was 
a significant change of attitude in the direction of methodological 
pluralism, as it involved a comparison of alternative theories, and 
not only a comparison of a theory's predictions with the available 
empirical evidence. However, it still left open the Quinian question 
of what to do in the presence of conditional predictions made by a 
theory which assumed untestable side conditions, so that it could 
neither be confirmed nor disconfirmed. 
 
1.8. For a long period, in the past, methodological pluralism 
was not very popular among Italian economists. The autocratic head of 
the liberal school in Italy, Francesco Ferrara (1810-1900), and three 
leading figures of economic purism, Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923), 
Maffeo Pantaleoni (1857-1924) and Luigi Einaudi (1874-1961), were 
against methodological pluralism. Ferrara, who held a narrow 
conception of economics as a purely theoretical science and followed 
an "absolutist" approach to the history of economic ideas, took an 
active part in the battle of method, where he opposed the historical 
school and the spread of "economic Germanism". Pareto, who began his 
scientific activity as a positivist, thought that there was but one 
legitimate method of doing research in economics, which he regarded 
as a natural science. Pantaleoni was only slightly more tolerant: he 
maintained that a single school of thought - the school of those who 
know the subject - is fully justified in economics and that any 
analytical progress in this science is bound to follow a linear 
trend. Einaudi favoured the idea of the existence of an economic 
"dogma" and thought that the history of economics should only deal 
with the internal developments of this tenet. (For a more detailed 
account, see chapter two). 
It took quite some time for the small group of methodologically 
pluralist social scientists in Italy to overcome this unfavourable 
situation and to re-establish legitimacy of attention to the history 
                                                          
8
  See W.V.O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View, Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, 
Mass., 1953, 2nd ed. 1963. 
 
of relationships between economic science and the great philosophical 
and political theoretic systems. 
In this variegated Italian context, fairly open to the 
international flow of new ideas, Popper's critical epistemology came 
as a truly innovative event. It was welcomed in the late Fifthies by 
Ferdinando Di Fenizio, who edited the translation of some of Popper's 
methodological works, and by a small number of Keynesian economists. 
The critics of the dominant neoclassical paradigm were ready to 
recognize in Popper an alternative to scientism, a methodology 
strictly linked with important currents of the marginalist doctrine. 
But some economists educated in the Paretian tradition also seemed to 
appreciate the attempt to remove from science any residue of 
psychologism, by distinguishing the logic of scientific research from 
the psychology of knowledge. 
 
1.9. Elsewhere, the success of the new critical epistemology 
had encouraged economists to adopt different blends of logical 
positivism and falsificationism, running from the methodological 
position held in the late Thirties by Terence Hutchison, according to 
which both theory assumptions and theory predictions had to be tested 
by the falsificationist criterion (with serious consequences for the 
validity of the neoclassical theory), to more conventionalist 
positions held in the Fifthies by other economists. The main 
reference is to Milton Friedman and Fritz Machlup, who maintained 
that the premises of economic reasoning were not required to be 
realistic, but only to be capable of generating testable predictions, 
so that the credibility of the neoclassical theory could be re-
affirmed, in spite of the scarce realism of its premises. 
The underling trend was to release economic theories from 
metaphysical notions and to regard them as simple instruments of 
inquiry, endowed with an explanatory power measured by the success or 
failure of their predictions. Theories could no longer be considered 
true or false, but simply adequate or inadequate to a particular 
task. A typical example of this instrumentalist conception was the 
operationalist-descriptivist approach suggested by Paul Samuelson, 
who denied any possibility of explanation in economics, but took 
description and prediction as admissible. 
On the whole, these empiricist methodologies have never been 
very popular among Italian economists, who show a propensity to 
internalize theoretical research, to reject factual myths and to 
welcome any attack on empiricism which casts doubts on the existence 
of an "objective knowledge". 
The strongest of these attacks - after that of Willard Quine, 
already mentioned - came from Russell Hanson's contention that no 
confrontation with empirical data could be accorded a decisive role 
in verifying or falsifying single theories, because factual 
observations are themselves "theory-laden", in the sense that they 
cannot be ascertained independently of a prior theoretical frame9. 
This amounted to a denial of the existence of a pretheoretic 
observational language, an opinion shared by several philosophers of 
science. In a similar epistemological perspective, Stephen Toulmin 
pointed out the importance of the phenomenon of the meaning variance, 
which prevents different paradigms from having common theoretical 
terms10. 
It was probably this unsatisfactory state of affairs which 
induced Imre Lakatos to distinguish between "naive falsificationism" 
- the unduly destructive notion that a theory must be discarded if it 
has been shown to be inconsistent with even a single piece of 
empirical evidence - and a "sophisticated falsificationism", a more 
acceptable notion that requires a number of negative tests to reject 
a theory, or a research programme11.  
An even stronger recently recorded reaction to prescriptive 
methodologies is the irrationalistic view which maintains that 
economic science is simply what economists do and that economic truth 
consists in what economists believe. This is a sterile position. The 
idea of justifying economic methodology by appealing simply to the 
current scientific practice of economists amounts to denying the very 
existence of a methodological problem. 
 
1.10. Modern epistemology has thus succeeded in dismissing any 
general principle proposed for the construction of a scientific 
methodology in economics. Feyerabend's methodological anarchism - 
summarized in his famous dictum: "anything goes"12 - and Lakatos' 
theoretical pragmatism, both of which reject single prescriptive 
rules and the very necessity of theory choice, are highly rated by a 
number of economic methodologists. The case for methodological 
pluralism therefore seems to be reinforced. But it has to be stressed 
that methodological pluralism does not involve aprioristic rejection 
of any methodological rule (i.e., methodological nihilism, or anti-
methodology). It has nothing to do with the idea that methodology has 
come to an end, or that it ultimately reduces to an astute use of 
rhetorical devices, a style of reasoning typical of a non-
demonstrative science. Simple abolition of any methodological rule 
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would leave an absolute vacuum, on which nothing could be edificated. 
It would mark the passage from Popper's critical epistemology to a 
wholly unconstructive critique of epistemology as such. 
Methodological pluralism cannot mean that any method of 
research is equally acceptable, as in art, or that all comparative 
merits and demerits between methods ultimately cancel out. It 
involves consciousness that the standards of evaluation of scientific 
research are bound to change over time and that truth should 
therefore be intended as a relative concept, similar to 
correspondence, congruence or coherence (three fundamental concepts 
in philosophic realism, pragmatism and in Nicholas Rescher's logic of 
plausible reasoning13). 
A distinctive feature of pluralism is its willingness to draw 
materials for methodological reflexion from the history of science, 
which testifies to the presence at any moment of a plurality of 
alternative paradigms and scientific research programs. The 
philosophy and historiography of economics are two distinct subjects 
with a common object of inquiry, which they study from different 
points of view. A large part of the philosophy of economic science 
has an essentially prescriptive intent, whereas the history of 
economic thought pursues reconstructive and critical aims. But I can 
see no reason for an opposition between the two approaches. Every 
interpretation of history rests on a definite methodological 
conception, as summarized by Imre Lakatos' famous Kantian paraphrase 
according to which philosophy of science without history of science 
is empty and history of science without philosophy of science is 
blind14. 
History of science supplies philosophy of science with 
historical research materials, so that the various contrasting 
conceptions on the nature and the evolution of a positive science can 
be appropriately tested. Philosophy of science, besides shedding 
intellectual light on the history of science, provides the latter 
with a whole spectrum of candidate criteria for theory appraisal.  
Without entering a full discussion of the vexata quaestio of 
the growth of knowledge, which still places believers in a Popperian 
"continuist" model in opposition to followers of a Kuhnian 
"discontinuist" conception, let me point out that if one puts the 
real relevant question - namely, what determines the appearance, 
growth and crisis of a theoretical system in economics - the 
existence of a strict connection between the methodology and the 
historiography of economics becomes absolutely evident. There are, of 
course theories which collapse when a certain type of institutional 
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organization of society is substituted by a different one. But other 
theories enter a similar crisis for philosophical rather than factual 
reasons. They fail when their logical inconsistency is definitely 
ascertained, as in the case of the classical and Marxian labour 
theories of value, or the neoclassical theory of income distribution. 
Still other theories are dismissed when they are shown to be founded 
on false philosophical premises (see Carey's and Bastiat's doctrines 
of economic harmonies). Philosophy of science may thus perform an 
important role in the development of the history of economic thought. 
And both of them may help economic research, wherever economics is 
regarded as a non-nomothetic theoretical subject, undistinguishable 
from its internal history and from its critique. 
 
1.11. At the present time, methodological pluralism is fairly 
deeply rooted in the critical approach to economic science in Italy. 
This depends in part on broader intellectual horizons than in the 
past and on a relatively recent tradition of thought which sets high 
value on heterodoxal styles of scientific reasoning; in part also on 
the type of education given in Italian schools and universities, 
where curricula generally do not privilege purely professional 
training and encourage personal ability to formulate critical 
judgements. Average middle-aged Italian economists are not simply 
experts in the use of analytical techniques, but also social 
scientists sensitive to the political significance of their studies 
and interested in methodological and historical-critical questions. 
They feel personally involved in the solution both of the great 
social problems of their time and the major theoretical questions of 
their subject matter. 
This kind of representative economist was formed in the Sixties 
and early Seventies, when the revival of a critical interest in the 
Ricardian and Marxian theories of value and distribution successfully 
questioned the dominance of the received monistic methodological 
view, according to which all economic phenomena obey a single logic, 
unaffected by changing institutional circumstances and by 
"antropomorfic prejudices". 
But the present situation is perhaps less satisfactory as 
regards the methodological and thematic preferences of the new 
generations of economic scholars. Younger economists appear to be 
more sensitive to further refinement of analytical techniques and 
purely formal exercices in model building than to recovery of the 
social responsability of political economy. There is therefore the 
risk of a new epistemological fracture which could draw the center of 
gravity of the economists' theoretical interests nearer to those 
exclusively internal problems which have in recent years been an 
increasing part of current academic practice. 
 
1.12. As a specific, though not exclusive, feature which 
characterized the evolution of the Italian economic science in the 
last thirty or forty years, it may be mentioned that a number of 
Italian economists who were not prepared to accept either the 
neoclassical or the Marxian concept of value stuck to the Sraffian 
theory of prices, in which they saw a more promising approach to some 
of the most controversial problems in the theory of capital and 
income distribution and a key for overcoming the mainstream tendency 
to keep the theoretical and political debates separate. 
Two different interpretations of the impact of the Sraffian 
approach on the Marxian theoretical system were offered. According to 
the prevailing one, the so-called "neo-ricardian" interpretation 
(shared by Pasinetti and, initially, by Napoleoni), the failure of 
the Marxian labour theory of value to explain relative prices implied 
the breakdown of Marx's basic concept of capitalistic exploitation 
and of the whole of his economic theory. On the contrary, the "neo-
marxian" interpretation (held by Garegnani) maintained that the 
Sraffian correct solution to the problem of price determination 
should not mark the end of Marx's theoretical system, but should 
rather be seen as a decisive factor of improvement in explanatory 
power of Marxian theory. Sraffa's solution was indeed seen by 
neomarxists as the decisive element which helped to free the Marxian 
system from the unnecessary burden of a labour theory of value, now 
regarded only as the instrument employed by Marx to avoid the risk of 
falling into circular reasoning in determination of the uniform 
profit rate and of relative prices.  
In the late Seventies, with the rapid decline of Sraffian 
economics - recognized as a devastating critique of both the 
neoclassical theory of value and distribution and the Marxian labour 
theory of value, but imputed either to be only half a general 
equilibrium system, irremediably deficient on the demand side15, or to 
be completely unaware of the real features of capitalism (class 
conflicts, disequilibria, crises) - the ambitious project of 
recovering into a great theoretical synthesis what was still valid of 
the tradition of economic thought running from Ricardo to Marx and 
Sraffa (with the possible inclusion of part of the Keynesian 
doctrine) definitely collapsed. The Sraffian "prelude to a critique 
of economic theory" thenceforth started to be considered for what it 
probably was: a perceptive introduction to a radical critique of 
economic thought, taken as a whole, and not the proposal of a new 
theoretical approach to the old problems of value and distribution, 
or an analytical description of the working of a capitalist economy. 
A less eclectic and more genuinely pluralist methodological 
climate then followed. It was due to the assumption of the 
illegitimacy of relying on illusive attempts to arbitrarily decompose 
and recompose heterogeneous theoretical systems into grand synthetic 
constructions differing in their premises and in their objectives, 
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  This is Joan Robinson's definition of the Sraffian price system, in "Prelude to 
a Critique of Economic Theory", Oxford Economic Papers, vol. XIII, 1961, p. 9. 
 
for this results in a loss of both their internal links and their 
general visions16. This uncompromising methodological position, whose 
chief exponent is Giorgio Lunghini17, seems to have marked an 
important turning point in the "post-Sraffian debate" in Italy, by 
making evident the illusiveness of getting significant results by a 
search for grand but innatural syntheses.  
 
1.13. Needless to say, the attention Italian economists pay to 
the construction of a critical knowledge has some practical 
disadvantage. In to-day's technocratic societies, where employers 
look for competent people in the perspective of their full 
integration in the productive system, wide cultural curiosity beyond 
the strict sphere of professional interests is not particularly 
appreciated. It is a risk factor, as from curiosity to critique there 
is but a small step. It is therefore easy to realize that it may 
involve a discriminatory behaviour in the demand for economists. In 
the search for a qualified job, graduates from a business school are 
usually preferred to "political economists". Cultural myopia and 
absence of theoretical-critical attitudes seem to be highly 
appreciated qualities for a rapid career as a business executive, as 
the most recent history teaches. 
In such a difficult climate, it is comforting to see that a 
number of Italian economists reject the idea of limiting the basic 
methodological choice to a rigid alternative between adoption of a 
single "objective" criterion of theory appraisal and the opposite 
choice in favour of free personal experimenting. They seem to favour 
a sort of middle-way methodological position, roughly equidistant 
from the codified rationality of science and the illimited freedom of 
art. It is mantained that such a solution is particularly suited for 
overcoming the traditional distinctions between values, facts and 
theories and for linking knowledge, expectations and actions. The 
idea of appealing to conventional rule for theory control is thus 
accepted as a pure matter of practical convenience, with no claim to 
impose a uniform model of search. 
The historiographic implications of this methodological 
standpoint move in the direction of acknowledging the temporal 
coexistence of several theoretical paradigms, in discontinuous 
evolution, whose relative success or failure depends on their 
respective ability to give significant answers to the major problems 
of the moment; not on their capacity for "puzzle-solving". Hence the 
Kuhnian distinction between the "normal", acritic activity of 
scientific research and the "extraordinary" activity, which consists 
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  For an example of these attempts, see A. Ginzburg and F. Vianello, "Il fascino 
discreto della teoria economica", Rinascita, 1973, n. 31, repr. in Marxismo ed 
economia: un dibattito di "Rinascita", Marsilio, Padova, 1974, pp. 15-26. See also 
a comment by B. Ingrao and M. Lippi, ibidem, pp. 125-31. 
 
17
  See G. Lunghini, "Il posto di Sraffa", Alfabeta, 1980, n. 13. 
in submitting the dominant paradigm to critical analysis in periods 
of scientific revolutions, is in a sense reversed: critical activity 
is assumed to be the normal situation, not the exception, and is 
therefore practiced with continuity by a large number of theoretical 
economists. The extent and persistence of the phenomenon may suggest 
that the positivist tendency to privilege science over culture did 
not leave lasting traces in Italy. 
Another distinctive feature of the methodological debate in 
economics which has taken place in Italy in the most recent years has 
been its tendency to be closely linked to the discussion of 
theoretical and historical-critical problems, rather than to be 
pursued as something interesting in its own right. Contrary to 
developments in other countries, where the methodological debate was 
to a large extent an epistemologists' affair disjointed from the 
problems usually discussed in economic journals, the tendency in 
Italy has been towards stricter association of the methodological 
discussion with substantial economic problems and with appraising 
specific economic theories or research programmes. This explains why 
the debate has taken place almost exclusively on journals of economic 
theory and history of economic thought. 
 
